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Russian Arctic in the Contours of the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation

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Abstract. During the decade of implementation of strategic planning in modern Russian reality, planning imperatives have also been introduced into the processes of geo-economic and political development of the Arctic, defining the system of goals and functional dominance of this geostrategic region, in particular, in medium-term perspective of budget policy implementation in 2024 and for the planning period of 2025 and 2026 [1]. During this period, Russia's importance in the system of international relations increased, the country's reputation and confidence in acquiring the status of a great maritime power, as well as in taking strong positions on land, as a state with centuries-old traditions of developing a large continental civilization, has been strengthened. At the same time, the role of the Arctic has noticeably increased, both among the regional directions of national maritime policy and in Russian foreign policy. Essentially, the Arctic began to determine the degree of state's greatness at sea and in the world. This requires the comprehensive development of maritime potential. The main thing is to ensure, through the maritime potential, Russia's guaranteed access to Arctic marine resources and space, including ensuring uninterrupted, preferably year-round, functioning of the national transport communication in the Arctic — the Northern Sea Route — the basis of the system of maritime communications. The Arctic nuclear icebreaker fleet and fleets of reinforced ice-class vessels are rightly considered the symbol of the Arctic maritime potential.
Keywords: *maritime power, Arctic, maritime potential, nuclear icebreakers, Maritime doctrine of the Russian Federation, strategic planning*

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Introduction

Among the regulatory documents of strategic planning of recent years [1], the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation of 2022 [2] and the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federa-

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[1] With the adoption of the Federal Law "On strategic planning in the Russian Federation" No. 172-FZ of June 28, 2014. URL: https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_164841 (accessed 09 February 2024).

[2] Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of July 31, 2022 No. 512 "On Approval of the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation". URL: https://base.garant.ru/405077499/?ysclid=lmt5iq45yo296296627 (accessed 12 February 2024).

tion of 2023 [3] stand out in particular, since these documents define the degree of Russia's positioning on the geopolitical and economic atlas of the modern world as a great maritime power. Such acts were adopted in the new Russia with a certain periodicity, but only the latter are classified as strategic planning documents that represent the target dominant of Russia's development, in particular, in the implementation of budget policy in the medium term [1].

In the 21st century, three versions of the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation are known, which reflect the totality of official views on the national maritime policy and maritime activities of the Russian Federation. These are the Maritime Doctrines of the Russian Federation approved by Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation in 2001, 2015 and 2022, respectively (MD-2001 [4]; 2015 [5]; 2022).

MD-2001, based on its geographical characteristics (the longest maritime borders in the world, its own coastline on the Pacific and Arctic Oceans, and relatively free access to the North Atlantic), defines Russia as a "historically leading maritime power". The same is emphasized in MD-2015 and other strategic planning documents regulating Russia's maritime and naval activities, in particular [6, 7].

However, MD-2022, based on the "national interests of the Russian Federation, which extend to the entire World Ocean and the Caspian Sea", defines Russia as a great maritime power. In addition to the presence and content of national interests in the World Ocean, the state of maritime potential is of key importance in confirming the status of a great maritime power. This is, first of all, the presence of competencies to maintain the economic, technical and technological base for ensuring the constant mobilization readiness of the Russian fleet and the means of developing resources of the World Ocean, especially oil and gas of the continental shelf, at the level of modern standards, as well as the availability of opportunities for the reproduction of naval and marine equipment on an industrial scale.

The national interests of Russia in the World Ocean, presented in MD-2022, partially combine and/or repeat the provisions of MD-2001 and MD-2015, but are mainly new, taking into account the modern realities of the development of the country's maritime activities. The emergence of such significant national interests in the field of national maritime policy indicates the

[3] Concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 229, 31 March 2023. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/copy/70811 (accessed 12 February 2024).
[4] Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020. Approved by the President of the Russian Federation on July 27, 2001. URL: https://docs.cntd.ru/document/902010411?ysclid=lp85km79am636682751 (accessed 12 February 2024).
[5] Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Approved by the President of the Russian Federation on July 26, 2015. URL: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_208427/ (accessed 12 February 2024).
[6] Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of naval activities for the period up to 2030. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of July 20. 2017 No. 327. URL: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_220574/ (accessed 12 February 2024).
[7] On the Strategy for the development of maritime activities of the Russian Federation until 2030. Order of the Government of the Russian Federation of August 30, 2019 No. 1930-r. URL: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_332557/ (accessed 12 February 2024).

change in the status of Russia from a leading maritime power to a great one and the strengthening of the country's role in the maritime activities of the modern world.

This is, first of all, Russia's preservation of the status of a great maritime power [8] in the context of a developing polycentric world (clause 3, Article 9) [9] based on the development of the Russian fleet (clause 4, Article 9) [10] and the implementation of effective naval activities (clause 8, Article 9) [11]. In the new geopolitical conditions, the Russian Navy performs new tasks to ensure the safety of pipeline transportation of hydrocarbons by sea (clause 6, Article 9) [12] and guaranteed access to the world's systems of maritime communications, including the most important straits (clause 7, Article 9) [13].

For the first time in the history of the new Russia, MD-2022 includes among the country's national interests in the World Ocean the rational use of the strategic resources of the Arctic, with special emphasis on the full-scale development of the Arctic continental shelf, including beyond the 200-mile exclusive economic zone [14] (EEZ, clause 13, Article 9) [15], if this is provided for by Article 76 of the UN Convention. The current Maritime Doctrine MD-2022 particularly emphasizes the need for the formation and development of the Northern Sea Route as a national transport communication as part of the attributes of a great maritime power (clause 14, Article 9) [16]. Thus, the

[8] Consequently, in the short period of seven years between the adoption of the two Naval Doctrines of 2015 and 2022, our country has transformed from a leading (in other words, a regional) maritime power into a great one, and this status should be maintained. During this period, fundamentally new elements of Russia's maritime potential were created: three frigates of the "Admiral" series (Project 22350 "Admiral Gorshkov") and other carriers of the sea-based hypersonic strike system "Zirkon" and the unmanned underwater vehicle "Poseidon" were launched and entered service as part of the Northern Fleet; a unique series of icebreakers consisting of seven ships of Project 22220 is being created at JSC "Baltic Shipyard" in St. Petersburg, including the icebreaker "Leningrad", laid down on January 26, 2024. Against this background, the NSR cargo turnover in 2023 reached a record high of 36 million tons, more than 5 times exceeding the highest achievement of the USSR. Source: Address of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on February 29, 2024. URL: https://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73585 (accessed 01 March 2024). But most importantly, during this period, the dynamics of global warming (the ratio of the area of ice melting to the previous similar period) was the most intense [2, pp. 146-157], and this created the illusion and gave hope that year-round navigation along the NSR could be ensured by a relatively small number of icebreakers, by building seven Project 2220 ships by 2030. At the same time, as a result of global warming, access to vast energy resources of the Arctic will be opened up.

[9] Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of July 31, 2022 No. 512 "On Approval of the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation". URL: https://base.garant.ru/405077499/?ysclid=lmt5iq45yo296296627 (accessed 12 February 2024).

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] The sovereign rights of a coastal state in the maritime zones of the World Ocean are defined by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN Convention) in terms of the territorial sea (Articles 3-4), contiguous zone (Article 33), EEZ (Articles 55-59) and continental shelf (Article 76), including beyond the EEZ. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) is allocated as a separate maritime zone as a historically established unified national transport communication. Navigation along the NSR is established by the legislation of the Russian Federation in accordance with Article 234 (Ice-covered areas) of the Convention. Source: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. URL: https://doc.mil.ru/documents/quick_search/more.htm?id=12093641%40egNPA (accessed 16 February 2024).

[15] Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of July 31, 2022 No. 512 "On Approval of the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation". URL: https://base.garant.ru/405077499/?ysclid=lmt5iq45yo296296627 (accessed 12 February 2024).

[16] Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of July 31, 2022 No. 512 "On Approval of the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation". URL: https://base.garant.ru/405077499/?ysclid=lmt5iq45yo296296627 (accessed 12 February 2024).

formation of Russia's maritime greatness is inextricably linked with the Arctic, with the increasing importance of this region in the development of the country. Therefore, the waters of the Arctic Ocean and the Arctic seas are (clause 3, Article 14) [17] vital areas for ensuring Russia's national interests in the World Ocean.

Consequently, the order of prioritization in determining Russia's national interests in the World Ocean and vital areas of support for the latter proves that the status of a great maritime power is confirmed, first of all, in the Arctic, in the Arctic regional direction of the national maritime policy. This determines the level of the country's diversified presence in this geostrategic region.

The special allocation of the Arctic among regional directions is also noted in Art. 50 [18]. The Arctic is the second most important region in Russia's foreign policy after the Near Abroad and stands ahead of the Eurasian continent, essentially China and India. This innovation of 2023 is associated with the geopolitical upheavals of previous years: in the Concept of Foreign Policy of the new Russia, including 2016 [19], the three regional priorities looked as follows: 1. CIS countries; 2. the European Union and NATO; 3. the USA.

The foreign policy concepts of the new Russia consider our country to be more of a continental than a maritime power [20], since the maritime component adequate to a great power is localized only in the Arctic [21], while in the other maritime regions of the country, there is essentially no ocean-going sea zone fleet. The location of oceanic sea zone ships by the fleets of the Russian Federation is presented in [3].

It is especially important that Russia is one of the two largest nuclear powers with all the competencies to ensure the functioning and maintenance of strategic nuclear forces (SNF) as part of the nuclear triad, especially sea-based SNF. In general (Article 4 [22]) the centuries-old experience of independent statehood together with the countries of the Near Abroad and adjacent states allows us to identify "the special position of Russia as an original state-civilization, a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power", that is, stretching in the space between Europe and the Pacific Ocean and representing the axis of the "Heartland" or the basis of continental civilization [6].

In general, maritime and continental powers coexist in the unity and opposition of world civilizations in the concept of "continent-vis-ocean" as two sides of the same coin.

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[17] Ibid.

[18] Concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 229, March 31, 2023. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/copy/70811 (accessed 12 February 2024).

[19] Ibid.

[20] In the 20th century, the Soviet Union was considered a great continental power of the world by one of the leading naval theorists S.G. Gorshkov [5].

[21] An indicator of the high class of Russia's maritime activities as a great maritime power is the UMKA-21 exercise, conducted in March 2021 (during the period of maximum ice formation intensity) in the high Arctic latitudes of 820N. During the exercise, three strategic missile submarines (SSBNs) — two Project 667BDRM Delfin, generation 2++, and the latest Project 955 Borei, generation 4 submarine — simultaneously surfaced in the ice at intervals of 300 m. This was the first time such a maneuver in the ice was performed. Source: "Umka" warns Washington: a military expedition in the Arctic with elements of science and show. URL: https://argumenti.ru/army/2021/03/715970 (accessed 12 February 2024).

[22] Concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 229, March 31, 2023. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/copy/70811 (accessed 12 February 2024).

In the diversity and on the basis of these powers, maritime and continental civilizations (essentially, great powers) are formed. In the confrontation of great powers, the main thing is the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on a potential or obvious enemy, which can be varied: military, political, economic or other [7, pp. 506–507]. The concept of unacceptable damage is so individual and subjective that, in fact, it cannot be unified in any way. In order to be a great power by definition, it is necessary to be a state that is able to resist the power of any other power and respond symmetrically (or asymmetrically) to all the challenges and threats of the latter. However, a truly great power should be considered a state that is recognized as such by the majority of the world's population.

The "continent-vis-ocean" concept and Russia's rights in the Arctic

The "continent-vis-ocean" concept is embodied in the form of a discontinuous (broken) line of contact between two world civilizations, the thalassocratic (maritime) and the tellurocratic (continental), with the basis for the existence of this structure being the unity and insurmountable opposition of these two civilizations. Constant contact leads to the fact that in the depths of one civilization elements of another are gradually born, which over time, with a shift in the harmony of the combination, are rejected by the basic (mother) civilization. In the combination of civilizations, the principle of harmony certainly operates: not directly, but indirectly.

In the vicinity of the line "continent — vis — ocean", there are coastal centers and zones that are in alliance with continental or maritime powers of the current state of geopolitical or other conjuncture. This is a discontinuous belt, the orientation of the components of which at any given moment depends precisely on the direction of the current vector of the conjuncture. While in the second half of the 20th century, the determining factor in the formation of alliances were economic considerations due to the specifics of the development of the dominant liberal economic model (LEM), in the 21st century, geopolitics is acquiring increasing importance. All the features of the coexistence of the "lords of the sea" and the "lords of the land" are successfully demonstrated in [8].

It should be emphasized that the "continent-vis-ocean" system is the basis of the universe. The disappearance of one of the components will lead to a global collapse and the destruction of the system of coexistence of world civilizations. An example of this is the collapse of the Soviet Union, which predetermined the geopolitical drama of Russia at the turn of the century [9].

In the context of global development and the establishment of the LEM in the world order based on rules, both civilizations strive for global superiority, that is, for world domination or dominance.

At the current stage of the decline of globalization, the tendency to assert national power according to the principle of "Make America (Russia, China) Great (Again)" and/or regional advantage is gaining strength. This means that on the geopolitical and economic atlas of the modern world, alliances of strong regional (or sectoral, for example, OPEC and OPEC+) states are being created, not yet powers, but which are quite capable of competing with the latter.

The maritime worldview is based on the well-known geopolitical concept of marinism, which was formed at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries under the influence of the scientific ideas of naval theorists F. Colomb [10] (Concepts of absolute possession of the sea) and A.-T. Mahan [11; 12] [23] (Theories of "Sea Power"). The main positive assertion of marinism is considered to be the universal maxims [12]: "power at sea decides the fate of history" and "who controls the sea, controls everything". That is, global superiority (dominance) or world domination is ensured through the implementation of the principle of "absolute possession of the sea" [24] [10].

In the theory of "sea power", the World Ocean is a unifying communication, a communication line that ensures the integrity of countries and regions "separated by water" localized along this communication — "the sea separates and unites", forming continental and/or maritime agglomerations.

From these positions, on the basis of the Arctic Ocean and the Arctic seas along the NSR, there is a communication unification of three oceans: the Atlantic, the Arctic and the Pacific, which ensures the connectivity and territorial integrity of Russia and the Eurasian continent from the north. From the south, the same function is performed by the communication unification of the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans. The unifying ring (Eurasia – America) is closed by communication: Pacific Ocean – Arctic Ocean (Northwest Passage) – Atlantic Ocean from the north and Pacific Ocean – Atlantic Ocean from the south.

The methodological basis for the formation of continental civilization is the concept of "Heartland" (core land), formulated in [6], which implements the maxim (by analogy with "Sea power"): "whoever owns the Heartland (that is, Central Eurasia), owns the world island (the continent of Eurasia), and whoever owns the world island, owns everything". Two worlds, two civilizations form a systemic whole. This is how the harmony of the universe is ensured.

By the beginning of the 20th century [6], the policies of European states and Europe as a whole, and consequently the main contours of world politics were determined by two established powers, two empires: the British (maritime) and the Russian (continental). The confrontation between them began with the Battle of Malta (1800) and over the course of a century developed and took shape in a geopolitical epic known as the "Great Game". The basis of the confrontation was that in the 18th–19th centuries, in the depths of the continental civilization of Russia, elements of the great maritime power of that time emerged and developed, which was demonstrat-

[23] These works were published as a reader with abbreviations in the Soviet Union by 1940. The ideas of A.-T. Mahan and F. Colomb were consonant with the prevailing views of the USSR's positioning in the world at that time: "Whoever owns the fleet, owns the sea, and whoever owns the sea, owns the world" (I.V. Stalin). The military shipbuilding program of that time (adopted in 1936) was grandiose and corresponded to the tasks of a great maritime power in the field of creating an ocean-going fleet: it was supposed to build 533 ships of the main combat classes, including 8 unrivalled battleships (type A "Sovetskiy Soyuz", displacement of 65.15 thousand tons), four of which were laid down in 1939, as well as 16 heavy cruisers of the "Kronshtadt" class. The implementation of this program was disrupted with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War [13, p. 173].

[24] The concept of "absolute possession of the sea" was introduced into scientific circulation by F. Colomb in 1890 [10] and includes military, geographical and economic components. As an example of the situation of "absolute possession of the sea", the position of the allies in the Crimean campaign of 1853–1856 is shown.

ed to the world by a series of glorious naval victories from Gangut (1714) in the Baltic Sea to Sinop (1853) in the Black Sea [25].

Legal regulation of the Arctic space is carried out by bilateral agreements and national legislation of eight [26] Arctic countries, as well as international law, including the UN Convention [27] on the Arctic Ocean and Arctic Seas. If the Arctic space is limited from the south by the Arctic Circle, the area of the Arctic is about 21.0 million km^2, including sea (including islands and land) — 13.6 and land — 7.4 million km^2. Russian territory in the Arctic is 3.3 million km^2 or about 45% of the total land.

Russia borders three Arctic countries: Norway and Finland in the west and the United States in the east. There are no border disputes and claims to continental territory, that is, the entire land territory of the Arctic is included in the zones of national jurisdiction of the Arctic countries. In the 1920s, that is, long before the adoption of the UN Convention, the sectoral principle of delimitation of the boundaries of polar possessions was formed. Canada, the USSR, Norway and the USA declared Arctic lands and islands located within the boundaries of the allocated sectors as zones of national jurisdiction.

In particular, the Soviet sector of polar possessions was formed in April 1926 by the Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR [28], which included all polar islands and lands [29] currently belonging to Russia with a total area of 0.2 million km^2 in the zone of national jurisdiction of the USSR. It should be emphasized that the sector principle that still exists determines the legal status of only islands and lands, without affecting other maritime zones, including the EEZ and continental shelf in the Arctic [14, pp. 4–12].

Russia, like other Arctic countries, strives to obtain sovereign rights to the Arctic waters covering the waters and airspace above them, as well as the continental shelf [30] within the boundaries of the declared sector.

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[25] This era did not last long and ended with defeat in the Crimean campaign (1853–1856) and the loss of the Black Sea Fleet. In the future, Russia did not have any significant naval victories and did not create a fleet of a great naval power. A separate sad story is the tragedies of the newest nuclear submarines “Komsomolets” (1989) and “Kursk” (2000).

[26] Five Arctic countries — Denmark (Greenland), Canada, Norway, Russia and the United States have direct access to the waters of the Arctic seas; three — do not have access to the sea and do not make claims in terms of sovereignty over the Arctic sea areas, islands and lands. These are Iceland, Sweden and Finland.

[27] UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 1982. URL: https://doc.mil.ru/documents/quick_search/more.htm?id=12093641%40egNPA (accessed 16 February 2024).

[28] On the declaration of the lands and islands located in the Arctic Ocean as territory of the USSR. Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of April 15, 1926. URL: http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc&base=ESU&n=8470#010794462544365202 (accessed 22 February 2024). This Resolution secured the rights of the USSR to “all lands and islands, both discovered and those that may be discovered in the future”, located between the coast of the USSR and the North Pole in the sector between the meridians 320 04’ 35’’ E and 1680 49’ 30’’ W. In 1935, it was established that, in connection with the Spitsbergen Treaty, the western border of the polar possessions of the USSR runs along the Spitsbergen square along the meridian 350E between the parallels 74N and 81N.

[29] The most significant islands and lands of the Russian Arctic include: Franz Josef Land, Novaya Zemlya, Severnaya Zemlya, Wrangel Islands, Kolguyev and Vaigach islands.

[30] According to the US Geological Survey, the Arctic contains 22% of the world’s undiscovered hydrocarbon resources: 90 billion barrels of oil, about 50 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of gas condensate. 84% of

According to the UN Convention, the length of the relevant maritime zone of a coastal state is determined by the total length of the baselines, and the maximum width is determined by the established values: territorial sea — 12 miles, contiguous zone — 24 miles and EEZ — 200 miles. The sovereign rights of a coastal state to these waters are limited by freedom of navigation, including transit passage of warships, and other types of maritime activities provided for by the UN Convention. The waters and surrounding waters beyond the EEZ are classified as high seas and cannot be an object of sovereign rights of coastal states. It should be noted that there is a special permissive procedure for navigation of foreign vessels in the waters of the NSR.

One of the ways to determine the outer boundary of the continental shelf (CS) is to fix this boundary at a 200-mile distance from the baselines, from which the width of the territorial sea is measured. This does not require confirmation by the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (Commission).

Thus, the conventional areas of the EEZ and the CS of Russia in the Arctic coincide and amount to 4.1 million km^2 with a total area of the polar sector of 5.8 (5.842) million km^2. That is, given evidence confirmed by the Commission, the maximum possible increase in the Russian CS zone is approximately 1.7 million km^2. The initial (December 2001) and revised (August 2015) applications confirm Russia's rights to expand the zone of national jurisdiction of the CS beyond the 200-mile [31] maritime zone by 1.2 (more precisely, 1.191) million km^2. A decision on this Russian application has not been made for more than 20 years [32]. The external geopolitical circumstances around Russia (sanctions) do not add optimism in the soonest positive resolution of this issue.

In the space of the Russian sector of polar possessions, a missing zone of the CS has formed with an area of 5.842 – 4.1 – 1.191 = 0.551 or about 0.6 million km^2 in the polar region covered by

these resources are located in the Arctic, 16% — in the subsoil of land territory. Source: International Legal Status of the Arctic. Dossier. URL: https://tass.ru/info/895685?ysclid=lswvnmm09p785067079 (accessed 22 February 2024).

[31] If the continental margin extends more than 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, the outer limit of the continental shelf is determined using Article 76 of the UN Convention with one significant limitation (paragraph 5 of Article 76 of the UN Convention) — the maximum possible distance of the outer limit of the continental shelf from the baselines may not exceed 350 miles, and from the 2500-meter isobaths — no more than 100 miles. The second criterion is applied only to underwater elevations. At the same time, the expansion of the rights of the coastal state to the continental shelf does not change the legal status of the superjacent waters and airspace of the allocated area (Article 76 of the UN Convention).

[32] Russia signed and ratified the UN Convention in 1997, prepared and sent to the Commission (December 2001) a reasoned Submission (application) for the expansion of the Russian CS beyond the 200-mile maritime zone by including the Mendeleev and Lomonosov rises as a continuation of the underwater continental margin of the Eurasian continent. However, the Commission did not find the arguments of the Russian side regarding the continental nature of the Mendeleev and Lomonosov rises convincing and proposed to revise this application. Following additional studies, in August 2015, a revised application was submitted to increase the expansion of the continental shelf boundaries in the Arctic by 1.2 (1.191) million km^2 by adding the Central Arctic underwater elevation complex — the Lomonosov Ridge and other areas of the seabed, including the Podvodnikov Basin, the Mendeleev Rise, the southern end of the Gakkel Ridge, the Chukchi Basin and the Chukchi Rise, as well as the North Pole zone. According to the lowest estimates, this will increase potential hydrocarbon reserves by 5 billion tons of conventional fuel. In April 2019, the UN Subcommission (a structural subdivision of the Commission) preliminarily approved the Russian application to expand the Arctic shelf and confirmed the geological affiliation of the objects included in the expanded boundaries of the continental shelf to the structures of the continuation of the Russian shelf beyond the 200-mile maritime zone and the continental margin of the Eurasian continent.

ice all year round. There is no answer to the question of whether this area is a continuation of the underwater margin of the Eurasian continent or not. Therefore, the belonging of this area to the continental margin of North America or Eurasia or the non-continental origin of this section of the shelf are equally probable.

This is how the contours of Russia in the Arctic are determined with unconfirmed sovereign rights to 1.2 million km^2 and the unspecified legal status of 0.6 million km^2 of the Arctic Shelf.

Around the Arctic regions, and especially in the NSR zone, a completely expected confrontation has developed between the US and Russia in the established traditions of "continent-vis-ocean". The essence of the remaining fundamental contradictions is that the US is striving for the internationalization of the Arctic Ocean space, including the NSR, while Russia insists on the principle of the sectoral division of the CS and the internal status of the NSR [15, pp. 59–67].

On the icebreaker fleet of a great maritime power and ensuring the NSR cargo turnover

The basis of the Arctic fleet, capable by definition of navigating in thin and solid ice, is formed by icebreakers and vessels of the reinforced ice class Arc4–Arc9.

The symbol of Russia's maritime power in the modern Arctic is rightly considered to be nuclear-powered icebreakers, which have virtually unlimited autonomy and are capable of overcoming even multi-year ice fields, creating a developed system of maritime communications to ensure the connectivity of the regional space.

The creation of the nuclear icebreaker "Arktika" project 10520, which was the first among surface ships in active navigation to reach the North Pole in August 1977, was an undoubted success of its time. This element received worldwide recognition as an achievement of a great maritime power. The entire series of six units of Project 10520 (Arktika and Sibir) and Project 10521 (Rossiya, Sovetskiy Soyuz, Yamal and 50 Let Pobedy) was launched and put into service over a period of 20 years, starting in 1972.

During the Cold War, the design of these vessels (in particular, Rossiya and Sovetskiy Soyuz) provided for the possibility of mobile inversion (re-equipment) into auxiliary cruisers, the corresponding equipment was placed on board these vessels and partially in the base warehouse.

The core of the Arctic icebreaker group at the turn of the century, until the decommissioning of Sovetskiy Soyuz in 2010 and Rossiya in 2013, consisted of vessels of Projects 10520 and 10580 [33]; These vessels ensured the safety of navigation along the NSR, mainly in the waters from the Gulf of Ob to the Yenisei Gulf in the areas of the large investment projects "Arctic Gate" and

[33] The nuclear shallow-draft icebreakers (draft 8.1 m versus 11.0 m for icebreakers of Project 10520) retained the best qualities of diesel icebreakers (type "Kapitan Sorokin"), but received practically unlimited fuel autonomy, which is required for the most important test line Dudinka–Murmansk, where there is a draft limitation on the depth of the fairway on the route section in the lower reaches of the Yenisei River. In the series of Project 10580 there are two icebreakers of Finnish construction at the shipyard "Holström Histalahti" in Helsinki, "Taimyr" and "Vaygach" with the assembly of the nuclear power plant at the Baltic Shipyard and delivery to the customer in 1989 and 1990, respectively. In 2017, the service life of the propulsion plant was extended until 2027 in parallel with the icebreaker Yamal in order to avoid an "ice pause" during the change of generations of nuclear icebreakers in the Arctic before the icebreakers of Project 22220 enter service.

"Yamal-LNG" (oil and gas) in the Gulf of Ob and "Norilsk Nickel" (non-ferrous metals) in the lower reaches of the Yenisei River (Dudinka).

A fundamentally new series of icebreakers of Project 22220 (Table 1) is intended to replace these vessels of Projects 10520, 10521 and 10580, the service life of which (except for the icebreaker "50 Let Pobedy"), taking into account the latest extension of the service life of the propulsion plant, ends in 2027 (Table 1).

Table 1

Project 22220 nuclear Icebreakers [34]

Name	Commissioning, year		Current status	Operator	Flag
	plan	fact			
Arktika*	December 2017	October 2020	Operate	Atomflot	Russia
Sibir*	May 2020	January 2022	Operate	Atomflot	Russia
Ural*	August 2021	November 2022	Operate	Atomflot	Russia
Yakutiya	December 2024		Launched, November 2022		
Chukotka	December 2026		Laying down, December 2020		
Leningrad**	December 2028		Laying down, January 2024		
Stalingrad**	December 2030		Laying down, plan, 2025		

* The lead ("Arktika") and the first two serial icebreakers ("Sibir" and "Ural") were put into operation with a significant delay of 1.5 to 2.0 years, which is due to the implementation of import substitution programs for components in the field of marine power engineering, in particular, turbogenerators for the icebreaker "Arktika", power plants for "Sibir" and turbines for "Ural". The situation with the substitution of supplies of imported components from Ukraine and the EU countries was stabilized by 2020. The total volume of imported components on ships of Project 22220 is about 10% [17, pp. 166–167].

** The laying down of the 5th and 6th serial icebreakers (Leningrad and Stalingrad) was postponed for a year from 2023 and 2024 according to the Plan [35] for 2024 and 2025, respectively, due to the difficulties of budget financing.

The modern icebreaker of project 22220 differs from the previous project 10520 by an increased service life (40 years versus 25), which is achieved by using the RITM-200 nuclear reactor with an optimal resource of 320 thousand hours, with core reloading performed once every seven years. In addition, the integrated location of the core and steam generators in a single housing allows for a significant reduction in the weight and size of the nuclear power plant, which reduces overall operating costs by increasing the reliability and safety of the nuclear power plant as a whole.

Achieving the shaft power (three shaft lines of 20 MW) to 60 MW allowed increasing the icebreaking capacity from 2.25 to 3.0 m. The width of the vessel (33 m at the cruising waterline) allows laying a channel 37 m wide (however, this is not enough to conduct gas tankers of the Yamalmax type with reinforced ice class Arc7 with a width of 50.13 m); following the icebreaker in

[34] According to the data from [17, Table 3] and the speech of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin on February 26, 2024 at JSC Baltic Shipyard.

[35] The Plan of Development of the Northern Sea Route for the period up to 2035. Order of the Government of the Russian Federation of August 1, 2022, No. 2115-r. URL: https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/405010751/ (accessed 4 March 2024). The plan includes more than 150 events with a total funding volume of about 1.8 trillion rubles.

the channel, the gas tankers break the edge of the channel to the optimal size. The 47.7 m hull width of the Project 10510 Lider icebreaker will allow laying a channel up to 52.0 m wide.

However, the main thing is that this icebreaker is universal for use both in shallow waters in the bed of Siberian rivers and on deeper sea routes of the NSR, since it has a ballast system for changing the draft from 9.03/9.3 to 10.5 m. The draft can be set at any level within the specified reversible values by filling/draining the ballast tanks. A full transition from 9.03 to 10.5 m and back is carried out using pumps in four hours. The use of one such icebreaker instead of two (heavy Arktika type project 10520 and shallow-draft Taimyr type project 10580) allows reducing the total cost of icebreaker escort by 1.5–1.8 times [36], depending on the number of changes in the draft level.

The construction of this series of icebreakers is carried out at JSC Baltic Shipyard [37], the customer is the State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom [38], which also partially participates in the financing of the third ("Yakutia") and fourth ("Chukotka") serial hulls of Project 22220.

According to the Plan [39], the financial resources of the federal budget and extra-budgetary sources (own funds of Rosatom State Corporation and/or borrowed funds under the guarantee of Rosatom State Corporation) for the construction in terms of preparation for launching and launching, completion afloat and conducting MTs (mooring tests) of Yakutia in 2022–2024 amounted to (clause 3.2.2 of the Plan) 10.00 and 15.51 billion rubles, a total of 25.51 billion rubles. The same for "Chukotka" in 2022–2026 with an extended program of preparation for launching (clause 3.2.3) amounted to 6.50 and 33.25 billion rubles, a total of 39.75 billion rubles. The construction of the fifth icebreaker ("Leningrad") over five years (2024–2028) and the sixth icebreaker ("Stalingrad") over six years (2025–2030) from the moment of laying will cost the Federal Budget (clauses 3.2.6 and 3.2.7) 56.61 and 61.34 billion rubles, respectively [40]. Budget financing is also planned (24.8 billion rubles in 2023–2027) for the construction of a nuclear-technological service vessel

[36] Characteristics and construction history of nuclear icebreakers of project 22220. URL: https://tass.ru/info/19827819 (accessed 26 March 2024).

[37] State shipbuilding asset within the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) since 2007. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 394 of March 21, 2007 "On the open joint-stock company "United Shipbuilding Corporation". URL: https://base.garant.ru/190816/ (accessed 4 March 2024). In August 2023, USC was transferred to the trust management of VTB Bank.

[38] The nuclear icebreaker fleet of Russia came under the jurisdiction of the State Corporation Rosatom in 2008 as part of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rosatom on the basis of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 369 of March 20, 2008 "On measures to create the state corporation for atomic energy Rosatom". URL: https://base.garant.ru/192963/ (accessed 4 March 2024).

[39] Order of the Government of the Russian Federation of August 1, 2022, No. 2115-r. URL: https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/405010751/ (accessed 4 March 2024).

[40] Against this background, the Russian Government's plans to reduce funding for the construction of four icebreakers in 2024–2026 by 4.28 billion rubles, or 3.2% of the Plan26 amount (Yakutia and Chukotka together — 0.56; Leningrad and Stalingrad — 2.36 and 1.36 billion rubles, respectively) appear to be a routine budget adjustment. Source: Financing for Baltic Shipyard icebreakers squeezed. "Fontanka" asked experts what all this means. URL: https://www.fontanka.ru/2023/10/20/72831971/?ysclid=lrutcewrhp23537488 (accessed 6 March 2024).

(clause 3.2.8) and Rosatom State Corporation (220 billion rubles in 2023–2030) for the creation of four non-nuclear icebreakers [41] (clause 3.2.11).

In order to ensure year-round navigation of vessels along the Northern Sea Route, combined options for the placement of icebreakers in the areas of the NSR routes are possible depending on the characteristics of the latter and the period of navigation, which is determined by the Rules [42].

Taking into account the peculiarities of navigation in the waters of the Arctic Ocean and the Arctic seas, the RMRS [43] distinguishes six classes of "Arctic" vessels, that is, vessels that have the necessary structural reinforcements for navigation in the Arctic seas. These vessels of the reinforced ice class Arc4–Arc9 (Arc8 and Arc9 exist only in theory) can navigate in Arctic ice independently or in a channel behind an icebreaker under certain ice conditions (Table 2).

Table 2

Characteristics of ice classes, ice thickness, m

	Independent navigation		Navigation in the channel behind the icebreaker	
	Winter (December–May)	Summer (June–November)	Winter (December–May)	Summer (June–November)
Arc4	**up to 0.6[1]**	**up to 0.8[1]**	**up to 0.7[2]**	**up to 1.0[2]**
Arc5	up to 0.8[1]	up to 1.0[1]	up to 0.9[2]	up to 1.2[2]
Arc6	up to 1.1[1]	up to 1.3[1]	up to 1.2[2]	up to 1.7[2]
Arc7	**up to 1.4[3]**	**up to 1.7[3]**	**up to 2.0[2]**	**up to 3.2[2]**
Arc8	up to 2.1[4]	up to 3.1[4]	up to 3.4[5]	without limitation [6]
Arc9	up to 3.5[7]	up to 4.0[7]	Episodic ice crossing by raids	

[1] in thin one-year ice
[2] in one-year ice
[3] in compact one-year ice
[4] in two-year ice
[5] in compact one-year and two-year ice
[6] in multi-year ice
[7] in compact multi-year ice

Ice fields in the Arctic are formed unevenly: the western part of the Russian Arctic is influenced by the Gulf Stream, therefore vessels of the reinforced ice class Arc4 and higher have the

[41] The strategic goal of building non-nuclear icebreakers with a shaft capacity of 40 MW is to replace the main nuclear icebreakers of Projects 10520 and 22220 in the deployment plan in the Gulf of Ob and Yenisei Gulf, including the lower reaches of the Yenisei River (i.e. close to the coastal and port infrastructure for the possibility of prompt replenishment of reserves), while ensuring the most important projects for this region by Novatek, MMC Norilsk Nickel, Gazprom Neft, Rosneft and Severnaya Zvezda to free up nuclear icebreakers for work in the eastern sector of the Russian Arctic with a planned increase in cargo turnover of the NSR to 220 million tons in the long term by 2035. Diesel icebreakers of such capacity can be built in Russia (well-known foreign shipyards are not considered for obvious reasons) only at two shipyards — Baltic Shipyard and Zvezda Shipyard, however, both enterprises, as is known, are loaded with orders within the current planning horizon up to 2030. Source: Rosatom has decided to build four diesel icebreakers at its own expense. URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2023/11/03/1004014-rosatom-reshil-postroit-chetire-dizelnih-ledokola?ysclid=lte3k2npv9688996252 (accessed 5 March 2024).

[42] Rules for navigation in the waters of the Northern Sea Route. Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of September 18, 2020, No. 1487 (in the current edition of 01.09.2023). URL: https://base.garant.ru/74664152/ (accessed 5 March 2024).

[43] Russian Maritime Register of Shipping. URL: https://rs-class.org/?ysclid=lteaaz10ab528729011 (accessed 5 March 2024).

structural capability to safely navigate year-round in the Barents Sea and in the southwestern part of the Kara Sea [16, pp. 37–43]. That is, in this water area the thickness of thin one-year ice does not exceed 0.6 and 0.8 m, respectively, in winter and summer.

For free navigation in the southeastern part of the Kara Sea, including the Yenisei Gulf, in the summer, vessels should have an ice class of at least Arc7; the same class is provided for vessels when navigating behind an icebreaker in the "channel" or "caravan" mode in winter [16, pp. 37–43] [44]. In these waters, the thickness of compact one-year ice does not exceed 1.7 m in summer, and 2.0 m in winter.

For work in the most difficult conditions of the eastern Arctic, where shore ice reaches a thickness of about 4.0 m, Rosatom State Corporation plans to build three hulls of Project 10510 "Lider" with a shaft capacity of 120 MW at the Zvezda shipyard by 2033. With such vessels, it will be possible to ensure year-round navigation along the entire NSR. The main hull of the Rossiya was laid down at the Zvezda shipyard in July 2021 using funds from the Federal Budget; 127.6 billion rubles has already been allocated [17, p. 165].

Thus, by 2030, the Arctic icebreaker group will consist of ten nuclear-powered icebreakers (project 22220 (7); 10510 (2); 10520 (1) — "50 Let Pobedy"), reinforced by non-nuclear (diesel) icebreakers. The strategic goal and planned dominant of this grouping is to ensure the safety of year-round navigation on the NSR routes, as well as the implementation of the NSR Development Plan for the period up to 2035 in terms of increasing cargo turnover, which reached 36 million tons in 2023 with a planned figure of 46.82 million tons.

The planned increase in NSR cargo turnover to 80 million tons [45] in 2024, to 90 million tons [46] in 2030 and to 130 million tons [35] in 2035 is provided for by strategic planning documents. These indicators are adjusted in the Plan [47], which sets the target indicator of annual NSR cargo turnover at 80, 150 and 220 million tons in 2024, 2030 and 2035, respectively.

The current Russian icebreaker group operating in 2024 has 41 ships, including 7 nuclear and 34 diesel-electric, including port ones. The most powerful of the non-nuclear icebreakers is the Viktor Chernomyrdin, Icebreaker8, which has a propulsion power of 25 MW, allowing it to op-

[44] Based on these considerations, the Arctic tanker fleet of the largest energy projects was built: three Arc6 oil tankers ("Vasiliy Dinkov" type) for the Varandey project and two Arc6 oil tankers ("Mikhail Ulyanov" type) for the Prirazlomnoe project in the Pechora Sea; seven Arc7 oil shuttle tankers ("Shturman Albanov" type) for the Arctic Gate project and fifteen Arc7 gas tankers ("Christophe de Margerie" type) for the Yamal LNG project in the Ob Bay, as well as five Arc7 container ships ("Norilsk Nickel" type) for MMC Norilsk Nickel (Yenisei Gulf and the lower reaches of the Yenisei River).

[45] Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, No. 204, 07 May 2018 (in the edition of July 21, 2020) "On the national goals and strategic objectives of the development of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2024". URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/43027 (accessed 26 February March 2024).

[46] Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 645, 26 October 2020 "Strategy for Developing the Russian Arctic Zone and Ensuring National Security until 2035". URL: https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/74710556/ (accessed 26 February March 2024).

[47] Order of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 01 August 2022, No. 2115-r "The Plan of the development of the Northern Sea Route for the period up to 2035". URL: https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/405010751/ (accessed 4 March 2024).

erate in Arctic ice up to 3 m thick. This icebreaker, built in Russia (Admiralteyskie verfi shipyard), was commissioned in November 2020.

To replace the main nuclear icebreakers of Project 22220 and 10520, the NSR Route Allocation Plan in the Ob Bay and Yenisei Gulf area requires diesel (non-nuclear) analogues with a capacity of 40 and even 45 MW. This will ensure the entrance and mooring of container ships and oil tankers to the ports of the Yenisei Gulf (Dudinka, Dikson, Sever Bay), as well as the maneuvering of gas tankers for the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 projects at the entrance to the Ob Bay.

However, modern non-nuclear icebreakers of Russian construction, such as "Viktor Chernomyrdin" with a lower propulsion capacity (25 MW), are optimal for work in the Gulf of Ob. The Aker ARC 130A icebreaker support vessels Alexander Sannikov and Andrey Vilkitskiy with a capacity of 22 MW are also used there to support terminal operations for the Arctic Gate oil project; these icebreakers were built at the Vyborg Shipyard in June and December 2018 by order of PJSC Gazprom Neft.

In previous years, all non-nuclear icebreakers currently operating in the Arctic were built in Finland, which imposes well-known geopolitical sanctions restrictions on the maintenance and repair of these icebreakers by the manufacturer. These are icebreakers built in the 1970s of the Ermak type (a series of three units) and Kapitan Sorokin type (a series of four units) with a propulsion capacity of 26.5 and 16.4 MW, respectively, as well as vessels of the 2010s of the Moskva type (a series of five icebreakers of Project 21900 and 21900M). The capacity of these icebreakers is not sufficient for year-round operation even in the relatively mild ice conditions of the southwest of the Kara and Barents Seas.

As the number of vessels passing along the NSR route increases, the arrangement of icebreakers also changes. Rosatom State Corporation assumes that, with the planned cargo turnover values, to ensure year-round navigation in the eastern sector of the NSR in the period from 2026 to 2030, five nuclear-powered icebreakers should be arranged at an interval of no more than 500 miles from each other. In the future, from 2031 to 2035, year-round navigation in the eastern sector of the NSR will be provided by nine nuclear icebreakers, spaced at intervals of no more than 250 miles from each other. The total need for icebreakers for the entire NSR for these periods is 14 (9 nuclear and 5 non-nuclear) and 18 (13 nuclear and 5 non-nuclear) vessels, respectively [48].

Conclusion

The basis of the Russian icebreaker fleet in the Arctic is organically supplemented by military icebreakers, Project 23550 ships with a capacity of 12.6 MW "Ivan Papanin" and "Nikolay Zubov" (built by JSC "Admiralteyskie verfi" for the Navy), "Purga" and "Dzerzhinskiy" (built by the Vyborg Shipyard for the Coast Guard of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation). In addition, a series of three 10.4 MW diesel-electric icebreakers of Project 21180 were built by JSC

[48] According to the Arctic Development Office of Rosatom State Corporation. Expert: by 2030, the density of nuclear icebreaker deployment on the Northern Sea Route will reach 500 miles. URL: https://dzen.ru/a/ZCVYx5PvUC4J0eLo (accessed 10 March 2024).

"Admiralteyskie verfi" by order of the Navy — "Ilya Muromets" (part of the Northern Fleet since 2017), "Evpatiy Kolovrat" (part of the Pacific Fleet since 2024) and "Svyatogor", which was laid down in 2023 [3, p. 55].

If Russia's naval power in the Arctic is rightfully associated with the world's strongest group of nuclear icebreakers, then in the World Ocean a great power should have an equally powerful fleet of the oceanic maritime zone.

At the turn of the century, along with the collapse of the USSR, the Russian fleet lost ships and left the World Ocean [3, pp. 53–55]. Of the ships of the oceanic maritime zone, there are only five left in the Russian Navy: of the four missile cruisers of Project 1164 "Atlant" built in the 1980s at the 61 Communard Shipyard (Nikolaev, Ukraine), only two remained in service by 2024: Marshal Ustinov (Northern Fleet) and Varyag (flagship of the Pacific Fleet); the missile cruiser Moskva (flagship of the Black Sea Fleet) sank while being towed in April 2022; the missile cruiser Admiral Lobov was transferred to Ukraine in 1993 when the Black Sea Fleet was divided. It should be noted that the competence to build missile cruisers of this class was lost along with the collapse of cooperative ties with Ukraine. Of the seven heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers (TAKR Project 1143 "Krechet"), built in 1970–1987 at the Chernomorskiy Shipyard in Nikolaev, today the Russian Navy (Northern Fleet) has only 1143-5, Admiral Kuznetsov, which after almost seven years (2017–2024) of repairs is expected to return to service by the end of 2024. The rest were either sold for scrap (1143-1, 2, 3 — one to China and two to South Korea), or modernized into warships for India (1143-4) and China (1143-6), one 1143-7 was dismantled on the slipway in 1992. The competence to build TAKRs has also been lost, and today Russia is simply unable to build such a ship.

The pride of the Russian shipbuilding industry is a series of heavy nuclear-powered missile cruisers (TARKR, Project 1144 "Orlan") consisting of five ships, built in the 1970–1980s at the Baltic Shipyard in Leningrad. However, this series of ships also shared the fate of the Russian fleet in the 1990s: the construction of the fifth hull was cancelled back in 1990. The lead hull ("Admiral Ushakov", Northern Fleet) and the next ("Admiral Lazarev", Pacific Fleet) hulls served in the USSR Navy from 1980 to 1990, then for more than 25 years they were prepared for modernization, then for disposal, until they were sent for scrap in 2021.

By 2024, there are two such ships left in the Russian Navy: "Admiral Nakhimov", which is undergoing long-term and deep repairs at Sevmash, with more than 200 billion rubles already spent, and the flagship of the Northern Fleet (in service since April 1998) "Pyotr Velikiy", which also requires similar expensive repairs.

Thus, if MD-2022 refers to Russia's status as a great global maritime power, then in the current geopolitical conditions Russia is simply unable to build and maintain a fleet (not only naval, but also tanker fleet, including gas tankers, as well as dry cargo ships and bulk carriers) adequate to this status.

If we are talking about the fleet of a great maritime power in the Arctic with access to the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean, then a series of ships of the far sea zone (Project 22350

"Admiral Gorshkov" built by JSC "Severnaya verf"), armed with hypersonic "Zirkons", the cost of which is 7–8 times lower than the "Orlans", is sufficient. At the same time, it is very important to ensure prompt inter-fleet crossings of surface ships by the Northern Sea Route all year round.

As it happens, the starting position for "preserving the status of a great maritime power" has been maintained only in the Arctic, so we should start from this point and make Russia great again.

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